Michael McNally - Over
the intervening centuries commentators have spilt an effusion of ink
in discussing both St. Ruth’s conduct during the siege of Athlone
and setting forth a number of theories that would presuppose that his
subsequent desire to fight a pitched battle was based upon a fit of
pique rather than any strategic consideration.
Athlone,
like many Irish towns was effectively two settlements, in this case
divided by the waters of the River Shannon. To the east, and built on
the higher right bank lay the ‘English Town’, an area of
relatively modern construction bounded by a trace of stone walls
which St. Ruth’s engineers has spent several months strengthening
and reinforcing against the inevitable bombardment by enemy. These
defences, however, were a paper tiger as, had St. Ruth even have
wanted to deploy there in strength, they could only accommodate a
small number of troops and once the town was invested by enemy forces
the Shannon would make further reinforcement of this eastern bastion
both difficult and dangerous.
On
the left or eastern bank lay the original settlement – ‘Irish
Town’ – which, with the exception of King John’s castle, a
mediaeval stone built structure, relied primarily upon a combination
of the river and an earthen embankment for her defence. It was here
that St. Ruth planned to mount his main defence, drawing the enemy on
to blood himself against the defence works, to waste time, manpower
and, above all, ammunition in a fruitless struggle to force the
passage of the river. Similar to the situation in ‘English Town’,
the left bank settlement could only hold a certain number of troops
before these numbers would have a detrimental effect on a credible
defence, and so St. Ruth elected to encamp a short distance from
Athlone with the main body of his troops, whilst the garrison units
would be slowly rotated throughout the army, theoretically allowing
the men to gain experience by a measured exposure to enemy fire
without compromising the defence of the town itself.
As
anticipated, the siege of Athlone followed established procedures
with the Williamite troops storming ‘English Town’ after a
sustained bombardment and then drawing up short as the Jacobite
defenders destroyed the main bridge and prevented any further
exploitation. With his attack stalled, Ginkel redeployed his forces
and began to establish a number of artillery positions from which he
could fire upon ‘Irish Town’ and thus weaken the defences whilst
he and his subordinate generals began to plan an assault to carry the
town. Eventually, and after several days’ artillery bombardment
during which much of the defences had been reduced to rubble, all was
ready and soon a column of picked troops was fording the Shannon
whilst below Athlone, Williamite engineers also swung a pontoon
bridge across the river in order to facilitate the passage of
cavalry.
In
the interim, St. Ruth had not remained idle, relieving and
reinforcing the town’s garrison as and when possible but his
ability to do so was severely compromised when the Williamites
constructed a battery of heavy artillery whose sole purpose was to
interdict the movement of troops between the Jacobite camp and the
town. At this stage the fate of Athlone lay in the lap of the gods
and whilst they initially held off the enemy assault, one of the
inherent faults in the Jacobite army came to the fore when a number
of senior regimental officers were either killed or incapacitated
during the fierce combat.
Given
Ireland’s unique cultural make-up, many of the regiments that had
been raised in the predominantly Gaelic west had effectively been
formed on feudal lines with the magnates becoming regimental colonels
and parcelling out the various commissions to family and relatives
whilst their dependants and retainers formed the regimental rank and
file. Thus it was that when Colonel Art McMahon fell at the head of
his men, they had not only lost their commanding officer but also
their clan chief and such a loss could not be filled quickly,
especially not in the vagaries of hand to hand combat.
Aware
of the deteriorating position within the town and braving the
Williamite artillery fire, St. Ruth ordered the main body of the army
forward to reinforce the garrison and throw back the enemy assault
columns, but within Athlone the defenders were slowly but surely
giving ground in the face of increasing enemy pressure and eventually
broke. After a half hearted attempt to assault the town from the
west, St. Ruth soon accepted that an ill-prepared attack would only
result in failure and an unacceptable loss of men marshalled his
forces together and, turning west, marched them toward Ballinasloe on
the River Suck.
It
was inevitable that, following his death at Aughrim, St. Ruth’s
conduct throughout the campaign would be the subject of great
scrutiny. For modern historians, it is an attempt to piece together
the manoeuvres of that fateful summer, but for many of his
contemporaries it was an ideal opportunity to ‘kick the dead lion’
and somehow excuse their own actions. One case in point is a report
from one of the French engineers attached to the army who suggested
that a large section of the westward facing defences could be
dismantled in order to facilitate that transfer of troops from the
army camp into Athlone, and vice-versa. That St. Ruth failed to act
upon this suggestion and the fact that when the garrison broke, these
selfsame defences effectively prevented any relief or counterattack
by the main army is one of the charges laid against him. But what is
invariably never taken into account is the fact that the Jacobite
commander was acutely aware of the enemy’s superior mobility and
ability to cross the Shannon both north and south of the town, and
thus had he have razed a significant section of the earthen ramparts,
it would most likely have compromised the garrison’s own ability to
defend the town.
Although
the defence of Athlone could be seen as a vindication of St. Ruth’s
tactic of inviting the enemy to waste men and resources in attacking
prepared positions, it soon became clear to many of his peers that
the price of such success was a loss of space in which to manoeuvre.
Just as it was clear that Ballinasloe was indefensible, it was also
clear that, if the Jacobite forces were not to completely surrender
the initiative to the enemy, a suitable position would have to be
found which would negate the Williamite advantages of numbers and
superior equipment, and as the army continued westwards it seemed
that such a position had indeed been found – the ridgeline of
Kilcommodan Hill to the south of the small village of Aughrim.
