Michael McNally - By
the end of 1690, although much of the country east of the Shannon lay
in their hands, the Williamite forces – despite all of the
propaganda – had failed to secure the decisive victory that would
bring the war to a successful conclusion. Indeed given the dual
nature of the War, it could be argued that the French victories at
Beachy Head and Fleurus, the latter being ironically fought on the
same day as the Boyne, did more than negate any benefits that had
been accrued in the wake of King James’s defeat and precipitate
flight from Ireland.
The
strategic situation was therefore apprised by both parties in two
fundamentally different ways – For William, Flanders, effectively
the southern part of his Dutch homeland, would always be the most
important theatre of operations and thus by the end of 1690 military
activity in Ireland had been scaled down slightly with a number of
senior commanders such as Heinrich, Count Solms – the commander of
William’s Dutch Guards – or Meinhard, Count Schomberg, following
the King to the Low Countries whilst Godaard van Reede (known to
posterity as Count van Ginkel, the title that he inherited upon his
father’s death in October 1691 and incidentally William’s third
choice for the army command) would lead a reduced army, albeit one
that was to be reinforced by the introduction of a protestant militia
in a series of mopping up operations that would gradually and step by
step constrict the enemy, eventually delivering them up with or
without the necessity of having to fight a pitched battle.
For
the Jacobites, the outlook was decidedly different for despite the
steady flow of arms and equipment which were regularly convoyed from
France, the main requirement was for trained personnel and thus, by
necessity they were obliged to remain – wherever possible –on the
defensive, using the advantages conferred by interior lines of
communication to switch troops as needed in order to meet and counter
any enemy thrusts, in anticipation of the news of a major French
victory in Flanders which many, outside of Ireland, viewed as the
main Theatre of Operations.
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The Marquis de St. Ruth personality model available from Warfare Miniatures Painted by Barry Hilton |
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A
veteran commander who had led both ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’
forces in Spain and Northern Italy, Charles de Chalmont – or as he
is more commonly referred to, the Marquis de St.Ruth – was perhaps
the best possible choice to assume the overall command of the
Jacobite forces for, more of a fighting soldier than a courtier, he
was intolerant of politicians and amateur strategists. Thus not only
would his new position of ‘Marshal of Ireland’ supersede all
other military appointments, it meant that, in his own sphere of
expertise at least, his word was the final one. In this manner it was
hoped that much of the petty factionalism and cronyism that had
plagued the Jacobite high command ever since the beginning of the war
would, at long last, be neutralised. In the final analysis, and given
the unique composition of the Irish army, it was inevitable that such
hopes would eventually be dashed but, at the beginning at least, the
new commander was able to capitalise upon Patrick Sarsfield’s
reorganization of the army and implement a number of measures that
would ensure that when it finally took the field in 1691 the Jacobite
army would, it could be argued, be in the best fighting posture than
it had been since the Tyrconnel had begun to issue army commissions
in the wake of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ and the deposition of
King James II.
Given
the strategic position in Ireland that he had inherited from his
predecessors, and the obvious need to hold the ‘Line of the
Shannon’, St. Ruth elected to establish a number of garrisons in
places such as Galway, Limerick and, perhaps most importantly,
Athlone whilst bringing the remainder of the army forward into a
position where it could support the front line positions. It came as
no surprise therefore, when it became clear that the Williamites’
initial objectives for 1691 would be the capture of the various
Jacobite outposts along the Dublin – Galway road which would be a
preliminary to forcing a crossing point across the Shannon, the most
likely target being Athlone, the capture of which would enable van
Ginkel’s forces to maintain control over the vital roadway, thus
facilitating the transport of men, supplies and, above all, heavy
artillery, into the western heartlands.
